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REVIEWS
Negotiating the Past: The Historical Understanding of Medieval Literature. By
LEE PATTERSON. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. xiv + 239
pp. $35.00 cloth; $15.95 paper.
Lee Patte)"son begins Negotiating the Past: The Historical Understanding of
Medieval Literature with quotations from Johan Huizinga, concerning the
necessary objectivity of the historian's project, and from S~nen Kierkegaard, concerning the "pretext of objectivity" that leads his opponents to
"sacrifice individualities entirely" (p. ix). Patterson wishes, rightly I think,
to avoid the naivete of either position. But he also wishes to show that contemporary historicist positions have not been objective but governed by
modern political considerations, and he wants to demonstrate this in such
a way as to be able to build on New Historicism while, in the process,
changing it in order to "rescue texts from the tyranny of context" (p. xi).
But if recent "language analysis" philosophy is correct in its claim that a
word's meaning is its use in the context and for the audience for which it is
used, there may be no rescuing us from the tyranny, or the liberations, of
context. That does not imply that all works from a period or milieu "mean"
the same thing but rather indicates that to mean at all they have to be
couched in rule-governed public languages. I
Patterson would take us away from the tyranny of context by grounding
us in approaches that go beyond context-a revised version of New Criticism, Auerbachian analysis, and New Historicism. In his account of New
Criticism, he describes certain liberal humanist attitudes that undergird it
and that underpin his project; it and he, according to his account, emphaI For detailed discussions, see Norman Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism oj
His Early Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 172-78; John W. Cook, "Wittgenstein on
Privacy," in Essays on Willgenstein, ed. E. D. Klemke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1971); Benjamin F. Armstrong, Jr., "Wittgenstein on Private Languages: It Takes Two to
Talk," PhilosophicaL Investigations, 7 (1984): 46-62; Paul A. Olson, The "Canterbury Tales" and the
Good Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 301-2.
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size "pragmatic empiricism over a priori theorizing, an ethics of attitude
over a code of rules, secular pluralism over doct.;-inal conformity, and
above all else the independence and self-reliance of the individual,. . . an
autonomous being," not conditioned by history but creative of it (p. 19).2
While Patterson claims this general set of assumptions as his own, he also
wishes for "a rearticulation of the grounds of support for humanist values"
(p. 25, n. 38). These values, modern "humanist" ones, though not very
clearly defined in the book, include the humanism of Erich Auerbach and
Charles Muscatine and that of the very different New Criticism (pp. 20-24)
and not that of medieval humanists such as Giovanni Boccaccio and Francesco Petrarch, who receive short shrift. 3 It is on the basis of a revision of
New Critical "humanist" attitudes and their successors that we are to learn
anew to "negotiate the past" as Patterson's method makes its claims over
against what he calls "exegetics" as well as deconstructionism, Marxism,
forms of the New Historicism other than his own, and other "narrow" or
"hegemonic" considerations of the past and past literature (pp. 3-71).
As a believer in the necessarily political and subjective nature of historical research, Patterson denies that "historicism either can or should be a
disinterested project" (pp. 8-9) and, therefore, rejects Hans RobertJauss's
notion that the object of literary interpretation is to recover "the expectations of the work's original readers" based on the study of the historical
sense of genre, literary-political context, and mimetic character (pp. 7-8, n.
9). Such efforts to reconstruct the meaning of past language are only
"traditional literary history . . . supplemented with a comparison of the
work to 'reality' " (p. 8, n. 9). That we can reconstruct the meaning of the
"language games" of what we label literature as lexicographers reconstruct
the meanings of words or phonologists the prosodic structure of poetic
language, i.e., with competence and objectivity, Patterson does not admit:
for example, in looking at Chaucerian literature, he regards us, in Wittgenstein's phrase, as always "seeing as" and not "seeing"-seeing it as "liberal
humanists" or "hegemonic" antihumanists, seeing the Chaucerian text in
the terms provided by the opponents of exegetics or those provided by
exegetics (pp. 3-74). Given such a perspective, one can find no "real" past
(though Patterson argues against the deconstructionists' reduction of the
past to "text" [pp. 58-63]); one can only make subjective constructions that
are politically motivated. Yet, to make his ·argument, to show that other
constructions of past literature are incorrect, Patterson has to rely on
l! I am indebted to Bruce Erlich of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln English Department, David Anderson of the American Academy in Rome, and Philipp Fehl of the University of Illinois Department of Art for numerous suggestions. The mistakes are my own.
3 Auerbach was, however, concerned with the historicity of modes of mimesis in a way that
most of the New Critics were not; see his Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western
Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953), pp. 546-57.
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words from the past that have discernible, reconstructable meanings or
probable meanings. He cannot use what Wittgenstein calls "private language."4 For example, in introducing his discussion of a portion of the
alliterative Morte Arthure, he says that "we need to understand what each of
the two sources could thernselves have been thought to mean" (p. 219, my
italics), not "could have been made to mean by the modern reader."
Patterson's first analysis treats what he sees as the primary subjective,
politically motivated constructions made of Chaucer in recent times, forcing these constructions, conservative and liberal, to become part of a
tourney in which liberal humanists defeat, and will continue to defeat, the
benighted, hegemonic antihumanists: "New Criticism (and its successors)
are always going to win . . . " (p. 39). As the descendants of the John
Ruskin-William Morris school of liberal humanists appear, in this interpretation, to have won out over the Catholic reaction and Emile Male, so also
the New Critics and the generation including John Manly, Robert Root,
John Lowes, and George Kittredge will destroy the followers of exegeticsthe Warburg Institute people, Erwin Panofsky, D. W. Robertson, Robert
Kaske, Judson Allen, and John Fleming. George Kane-E. Talbot Donaldson forms of liberal humanist editing will presumably be preferred over
Lachmannian conservative forms. And liberal humanism wins in literature
as well as criticism as, in later sections of the book, Patterson goes on to
find individualism, autonomy, and self-reliance in medieval works from
those of Chretien de Troyes to the Morte Arthure.
Since negotiating the literary past is crucially an act of construction,
Patterson shows convincingly that we can construct a liberal, humanist
medieval literature. I do not know that anyone doubted that such a construction was possible. Indeed, the reality of medieval culture suggests that
even medieval thinkers recognized strands such as those Patterson would
hold up for examination. No one would deny that Ezzelino III da Romano
was an individualist, and medieval authors who are themselves quite conservative in theological expression speak of Epicureans in their own day
who live fundamentally for this-worldly values. One finds institutions for
accommodating individualism-the parlement-and there are literary
works representing how individualism is handled in the process of creating
sufficient social consensus to permit action-for example, Chaucer's description of his bird parliament. But even as I find it difficult to believe that
all modern historicist projects are essentially political, I also cannot concur
that liberal humanism of the kind Patterson projects is to be found in the
4 Cf. n. I, above. For a brilliant analysis of the importance of context in the history of
literary language that is applicable both to deconstructionism and to much that Patterson
discusses, see M. H. Abrams, "The Deconstructive Angel," Crill, 3 (1977): 425-28; for the
significance of the relationship of the study of precise contexts and actions to the understandillg of the meaning of text", see Bruce Erlich, "Amphibolies: On the Critical SelfContradictions of 'Pluralism,' " Critl, 12 (1986): 540-41.
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medieval authors in which he finds it, and the price of his discovery may be
a sacrifice of the accuracy necessary at least to old-fashioned history.
For example, to make the New Critics one pole of his Chaucerian argument, Patterson characterizes them as liberal humanists without any wrestling with the "brother to dragons" religious, political, and cultural conservatism that characterized the literary and political activity of Allen Tate,
John Ransom, Van Wyck Brooks, and the T. S. Eliot to whom they looked,
a conservatism that many scholars have seen as lying behind all of the
relishing of ambiguity, irony, and complexity that characterized their work
(pp. 18-27, 102-10).
Again, to make the "Whig" Chaucerians of the first half of the century
pass the liberal muster, Patterson has to separate their objective historical
Chaucer from their subjective humanist one, their scholarship from their
criticism. But these were not as separated a~ Patterson argues; the "Whigs"
knew that, in their historical work, they were not only finding sources but
reconstructing the meaning of the language of the poetry they treated.
And they often did so well-in describing Chaucer's prosody, in creating
editions and annotating them with "historical" notes, in reconstructing the
science, theology, and philosophy that inform Chaucer's language. Lowes
on the lover's malady, Howard Patch on Boethian terminology in Chaucer,
Walter Clyde Curry on scientific paradigms lying behind Chaucer's language-such productions tell us not only about sources but about how
Chaucer's words work in the language games of the fourteenth century
and are, therefore, criticism in the best sense. If those lumped together by
Patterson as the school of exegetics (wrongly so lumped, I think) have
modified the characterization of this century's earlier Chaucerian "Whig"
critics, they have done so by giving additional attention to how Chaucer
and his contemporaries described the workings of the language of poetry-its various generic languages. In any critical project worthy of the
name, the discovery of new information about the language of a particular
milieu will change interpretations on an objective basis. Furthermore, acknowledging the fact that what we do not know about the specific context
of a work of literature may well encourage differences of opinion among
interpreters (based on differing speculative assumptions) is not the same
as making subjectivity or the discovery of subjectivity an overriding principle of interpretation, whatever historical linguistics may tell us about the
meanings of words, phrases, and sentences.
The "facts" of literary scholarship and criticism cannot be primarily
constructions of a paradigm group if we are to deal with history at all; they
"exist" and have to be dealt with independent of paradigm. 5 Insofar as
r, For the interaction of "facts" and interpretive paradigms in the physical sciences, see
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd cd. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970), esp. p. 197.
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there is a literary past to be negotiated, it resides in those "facts" and in
constructs that do not primarily depend on the historical placemen t or
ideology of the critic. One of the crucial "facts" that must be taken into
account is medieval reader response, which should, in literary studies, be
an aspect of historical linguistics. A baker's dozen of medieval commentaries on the Commedia exist and differ in some details of interpretation
(clearly medieval individualism does come into the act of interpretation of
Dante's poem), but the general construal of Dante's text and the mode of
construal remain remarkably similar across the commentaries and are
quite different from most modern readings. These medieval readings tell
us what general reading habits, or assumed language games, were in the
case of Dante's poem and where the parameters of individual interpretation lay. The same could be said for commentary on Ovid, on Ve rgil , on
Roman de La Rose-like poems, on the Vulgate Arthurian romances, among
numerous other genres and individual works. The habits of reading may
also change diachronically and from court to court, and it is also the job of
the critic to get at these changes, partly by looking at what individual
literary people and groups read and partly by looking at how they read.
One may illustrate the problem implicit in Patterson's notion of the
necessarily subjective and political nature of interpretation through an
analysis of his treatment, in his section on recent Chaucer criticism, of
Male and Panofsky as the founders of exegetics. In describing Male, Patterson speaks of the scholarship of the ecclesiologists of the Cambridge
Camden Society who published Durandus's Rationale and of Napoleon
Didron, Rene de Chateaubriand, Abbe Cahier, and Male-who discovered
"iconography"-as simply manifestations of "the conservative and institutional view" of the Middle Ages (pp. 30-31). But, surely, what they did is not
all "view." Surely the questions one asks of Male are "Is all that figurative
content really there in the Gothic images? What is the evidence? For what
audiences was it there? In what communities?" as one would ask the same
questions of a dictionary maker. The question is not ''Was he Catholic?"
but "Did his modern commitments lead him to project fantastic meanings
on this or that medieval image?"
The same argument may be made about Patterson's treatment of what
he regards as the second root of exegetics: German Geistesgeschichte as
represented in Friedrich Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey, Karl Lamprecht, and
ultimately Panofsky, who stood for a positivizing of Geistesgeschichte (pp. 2836).6 Geistesgeschichte is said to have been seen by Ernst Gombrich-in what
fi What Patterson means by his "positivist" characterization of Panofsky, beyond the notion
that he tried to make generalizations about paintings, courts, and cultural milieus by moving
from particular to generalization and back, is unclear. Indeed, his general picture of how
particulars and generals relate in the process of historical reconstnIction is weak: in another
section, as Erlich has pointed out to me, Patterson's extended analysis of Theodor Adorno
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Patterson calls an "oversimplification" but not an untruth-as a proto-NaziHegelianism (p. 29, n. 44).7 It would appear to follow that Panofsky's work,
which is based on Geistesgeschichte, represents a species of neoconservative
effort derived from this Hegelianism-from the notion that the "Timespirit" simply manifests itself in the detail of specific works and can be
discerned apart from the acts of specific reconstruction of the meaning of
a work. Presumably, none of this would mean anything to Robertson or to
those whom Patterson classifies as belonging to the school of exegetics, for
they are blissfully ignorant of the subtleties of nineteenth-century German
historiography and metaphysics. 8 If they have caught the disease, they must
have got it from Panofsky, who was an influence on Aby Warburg and his
institute. And so it is on Patterson's characterization of Panofsky and Warburg that much of the early part of his book rests.
In characterizing Panofsky, Patterson unfortunately does not use Michael Ann Holly's Panofsky and the foundations of Art History, which shows
that, while the early Panofsky was influenced by Dilthey's form of Geistesgeschichte, he was also influenced by the more scientific linguistic studies of
Ferdinand de Saussure, by Charles Pierce and, perhaps, by the early
Wittgenstein. 9 Holly further demonstrates that the fundamental influence
on Panofsky was Ernst Cassirer, who was hardly a practitioner either of
Geistesgeschichte or positivism. Cassirer was, above all, a Kantian who was an
opponent of Nazism and of the Heidegger whose subjectivism Patterson
approves (p. 43). Cassirer, like Panofsky, seems to have hated all forms of
hegemonic thought. 1O Panofsky's ideal modus operandi was, as he put it
himself, "the use of historical methods tempered, if possible, by [the]
common sense . . . to ask ourselves whether or not the symbolical sign i-

and Walter Benjamin (pp. 70-74) does not tell one how the medievalist comes to generalization, nor does it accurately picture Adorno's presentation of Benjamin's understanding of
the general character of a past period through a technique that requires fixing its details in
order to see what the alternatives might be.
7 Just what Patterson is saying about Hegelian Geistesgeschichle through citing a characterization of it as "proto-Nazi-Hegelian" is not clear. If he agrees with the characterization, he
should defend it; if he does not, he should not cite it as if it were relevant to his argument.
H I have examined the writings of the practitioners of exegetics and have failed to find
citations of the practitioners of Geistesgeschichte aside from Panofsky.
9 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 21-45.
10 For Cassirer's political thought, see The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1946); see David R. Lipton, Ernst Cassirer: The Dilemma of a Libemllntelkctual in Germany, 1914-1933 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 155-59, for Cassirer's
1929 Davos debate with Heidegger; cf. Hendrik J. Pos, "Recollections of Ernst Cassirer," in
77ze Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, Library of Living Philosophers, 6
(Evanston, III.: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), pp. 67-69; cf. Victor Farias, Heidegger et
k nazisme (Rieux-en-Valle: Verdier, 1987), esp. p. 78. Heidegger's assertion of the necessary
subjectivity of i~Herpretation, cited approvingly by Patterson (p. 43), is a view not unrelated
to Heidegger's acquiescence to the "inner truth" of the triumphant ideology in Germany in
the 1930s. Thus Heidegger and Cassirer-Panofsky appear to have exchanged seats in Patterson's book.
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ficance of a given motif is a matter of established representational tradition; . . . whether or not a symbolical interpretation can be justified by
definite texts or agrees with ideas demonstrably alive in the period and
presumably familiar to its artists" and is "in keeping with the historical
position and personal tendencies of the individual master" (quoted by
Holly, p. 164; see pp. 155-57 for Panofsky on the relation of the formal and
the societal context). Panofsky's method is also said by Patterson to parallel that of Warburg in its reliance on Geistesgeschichte and the search for a
Weltanschauung (p. 36). But Patterson cites Gombrich approvingly in much
of this section while ignoring Gombrich's assertion, in his magisterial Airy
Warburg: An Intellectual Biography, that Warburg's approach forced the "art
historian to abandon the generalities of Geistesgeschichte" and focus on
individual people and images. I I To the degree that exegetics has learned
from Panofsky and Warburg, it- has learned from their going beyond
Geistesgeschichte to the characterization of artistic "languages" demonstrably
alive to specific courts, villages, monasteries, and milieus and appropriated
by specific individuals to speak, in the language of the cultural pattern,
what goes beyond pattern. Where exegetics has failed, it has asserted the
general without approaching it through the particular. That the people
whom Patterson attacks have someti,mes failed to do good analyses no
one-certainly not they-would deny, but the demonstration of this depends not on the artificial creation of schools having members with dubious ancestors but on evidence showing where and how a specific analysis is
"wrong" in senses that I shall endeavor to spell out.
First, the assertion that iconological investigations inevitably lead to the
discovery of "hegemonic" meanings is incorrect. Although general assumptions about a period's or culture's character cannot be substituted for a
close analysis of works written in the languages available to the culture, in
principle, iconological understanding is neither "hegemonic" nor "antihegemonic": for example, the same Nimrod figure who served Augustine
in his account of the origins of dominium (The City of God, 16.4) serves
Chaucer's cry against the abuse of that dominium in the avarice, treason,
and murder of his own day in The ronner Age (lines 58-63) and served, implicitly, in John Ball's revolutionary call to the Peasant's Revolt. 12 The
figure is the same, appropriated in differing directions.
Again, in the area of medieval editing, though I am not sufficiently an
editor to enter into the quarrels over the Kane-Donaldson Piers Plowman, I

II Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 315. For a useful analysis of the limitations
inherent in characterizing a work of art only in terms of its period associations, see Philipp
Fehl, "Turner's Classicism and the Problem of Periodization in the History of Art," Crill, 3
(1976): 93-129.
12 Rodney Hilton, Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising oj
1381 (London: Temple Smith, 1973), p. 222.
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find it difficult to believe that Lachmann primarily sought the simple,
modern, conservative "cultural" goal of "a text that was, above all else,
stable" (p. 106). Further, the argument that allows for Kane-Donaldson's
assumptions about the individualism and genius of the poet as opposed to
the scribe, i.e., that "scribes habitually made the same mistakes independently" (p. 84), could surely be subjected to empirical verification using
texts manually transcribed in modern cultures having a scribal tradition. 13
Patterson's efforts to avoid the tyranny of context lead him periodically
to avoid the detailed as he looks for the general or to seize on the general
while avoiding important details that cry out for interpretation. If, for the
deconstructionists, as Paul de Man says, "texts masquerade in the guise of
wars or revolutions,"14 in Patterson they shed the masquerade but do ,not
acquire a body; they do not refer to, or derive their meaning from, specific
detailed history that takes in all of the surfaces of the passages interpreted.
For example, Patterson's argument for a hedonistic reading of Chaucer's
Troilus through the eyes of the monastic translation of David of Augsburg
does not place the analogies between ghostly and carnal love drawn in the
translation against anyone aside from Ovid, not against the larger Canticum
tradition that surely informs the passage (pp. 115-53). The Canticum was
the favorite monastic book dealing with love and included the notion
treated in the translation of David of Augsburg that spiritual and carnal
love were, in some sense, parallel, and that one could quite readily be sick
with love: "quia amore langueo."15 Patterson appears to feel it unusual that
the translation, the Disce mori, sees the action of the Troilus as fully "real
. . . accurate . . . depiction of human conduct . . . an exemplary instance" (p. 147) without an allegorical subtext. But tragedies, according to
medieval criticism, always treated of exemplary instances, the presence of
the real does not always exclude the allegorical subtext, and, if the
Canticum was read as an allegory, it was also often read as an account of a
male/female love relationship-Pierre d'Ailly reports that some say it concerns a love between Solomon and a concubine but that it really treats that
between Solomon and his wife. 16 On the basis of the Canticum, the Disce
U For an account of an editing procedure that rejects aspects of Lachmann and concentrates on individual texts as indices of the local and individual, see David Anderson, "The
Method of Billanovich," unpublished paper available from the author. For Billanovich's own
position, see his I primo umanisti e Ie tradizioni dei classici latini (Friburgo, Svizzera: Edizioni
universitarie, 1953).
14 Blindness and Insight: .Essays in the Rhetmlc of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 165. Although Patterson includes an excellent attack
on the deconstructionists' reduction of the past to "textuality," his own emphasis on subjectivism in the understanding of texts from the past tends to have the same effect; for a useful
essay on the notion that de Man's type of reading will eliminate "not only literary history but
history itself," see David H. Hirsch, "Paul de Man and the Politics of Deconstruction," SR, 96
(1988): 330-38, a cautionary essay that also has some relevance to Patterson's approach.
u Canlic1l1n 5.8.
16 "Super Cantica Canticorum," Opuscllia Spiritualia (Douay, 1634), pp. 468-69.
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mori translator had every reason to note the analogies and differences
between ghostly and carnal love, whether attractive young novices of the
opposite sex were available to him or not (see p. 144). And he had every
reason to use the Troilus as an example of the latter.
Again, Patterson's interpretation of the medieval historicism (pp. 15783) appearing in the Roman d'Eneas would be stronger if it recognized the
character and limits of the differing sorts of historicism implicit in common readings of Vergil available in the twelfth cen tury-Se rvi an , Fulgentian, and Chartrean interpretations of the great Roman poet of history and
the beyond-history. His insightful analysis of the analogies between the
Roman d'Eneas and Chretien de Troyes's Erec et Enide would be strengthened through consultation with the same commentary traditions. For example, the adorning of Erec after his Vergilian quest with the Macrobian
robe of the quadrivium and the scepter of creation (lines 6671-6824)
surely refers both to Macrobius's characterization of Vergil in The Saturnalia as creating a world like God's (5.1.18-20) and to subsequent commentary, especially on Book 6, that sees Aeneas's journey into fabulous
places as not only a historical trek but one to the mastery of the liberal arts'
trivium and quadrivium. The Erec may celebrate not so much the power of
Enide's subjectivity as the possibility of humankind's coming to the quadrivium's objective knowledge.
Finally, Patterson's reading of the Morte Arthure, given his political discussion and his placement of the work in 1399-shortly after Richard II's
deposition--curiously does not relate the poem's continental imperial
theme either to Richard II's imperial ambitions late in his reign or show
why it does not refer to the king's designs on the continent.!'
In short, in order to find his sort of "liberal, humanist" meanings with
the poems analyzed, Patterson has to ignore many of the works' semiotic
contexts that I believe important to interpretation, whether one finds in
the end a "liberal" or a "hegemonic" meaning. I would argue that works of
late medieval poetry are usually written in qualifying contexts that are
more than constructs in the battle between Whig and Tory. By knowing in
detail these historic constraining contexts-linguistic, generic, political,
social-we can, I think, know both what is individual and what is cultural in
what the poet says and find, at the end of our search, something that goes
beyond what we began seeking. In the end we will have to decide what our
own political stance is in relation to the work-do we in fact see it as
legitimizing tyranny and injustice? But that is a separate act from negotiating the past and should not be confused with it. Male, Lowes, Panofsky,
17 May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp.
475-98; cr. D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, "The Foreign Policy of Richard II in 1397: Some Italian
Letters," English Historical Review, 56 (1941): 628-37.
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and Robertson all may be wrong in specific interpretations of artistic
works, but showing this depends not on placing them in a tourney of Whig
and Tory and predicting who will win. It depends on displaying how, in
their interpretations of specific works, they ignore or misconstrue the
words of poems and their qualifying con texts. The same may be said of the
other schools Patterson creates and criticizes. He is surely right to ask us to
look at whole texts, but he ought to ask us to look more closely and-dare I
say-accurately. Patterson warns us against operating "beyond the closed
world of textuality" where we posit the literature we read as the historically
real. There is another sense in which the world of textuality is open, open
to reconstruction in terms of what we can know of history-through the
study of archaeology, historical linguistics, medieval reader response, the
remnants of the past extant in modern institutions, and, most of all,
through the study of the language games outside literature used in specific
contexts, without which the language of literature would not exist.
PAUL A. OLSON
University of Nelrraska-Lincoln

Wordsworth's Revisionary Aesthetics. By THERESA M. KELLEY. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. xiv + 249 pp. $39.50.
Wordsworth's Revisionary Aesthetics follows a number of recent and important studies that effectively put William Wordsworth in his place. In James
K. Chandler's Wordsworth's Second Nature: A Study of the Poetry and Politics,
this placement or re-placement of the poet amounts to taking a harder
look at Wordsworth's politics, which, according to Chandler, were more
conservative and more Burkean, even during the poet's putatively radical
or liberationist phase, than the largely liberal fashions of literary history
have hitherto allowed. I Kenneth R. Johnston in Wordsworth and "The Recluse" takes a related tack. 2 By carefully examining the poems and fragments that were to have been part of the poet's never-completed magnum
opus The Recluse, Johnston is able to show a genetic pattern running
through works as disparate as The Prelude and The Excursion by which the
claims of the self and imagination are apparently counterbalanced and
subsumed by a sense of the poet's social and civic obligations. And now, in
Wordsworth's Revisionary Aesthetics, the apocalyptic, visionary, "humanistic"
Wordsworth is dealt what may likely be the most devastating blow yet,
since, according to Theresa M. Kelley, the poet apparently never really
wanted to be that ''Wordsworth'' in the first place.
1
2

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.

